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Abstract 
This paper, based on theories of ecological perception, embodied motivated cognition, and evolutionary psychology, 
proposes that pictures elicit evolved biologically imperative responses more quickly and thoroughly than do words. 
These biologically imperative responses are directly responsible for evolved automatic reactions away from biological 
threats (e.g. escaping predators, avoiding disease and noxious stimuli) and towards opportunities (e.g. consuming food, 
approaching mates, finding shelter) in the environment. When elicited, these responses take time to occur and may de-
lay or interfere with other types of behavior. Thus, when environmental information is presented in pictures (which 
should elicit larger biological responses than words) biological responses should interfere more with higher order tasks 
like information processing and cognitive decision-making. To test this proposition we designed an experiment in which 
participants performed speeded categorizations of 60 pairs of matched pleasant and unpleasant environmental oppor-
tunities and threats. They categorized the items based on their form (is this a word or a picture?) or based on how the 
picture made them feel (is this pleasant or unpleasant to you?). If pictures do elicit greater biologically imperative re-
sponses than their word counterparts, participants should be able to make form decisions faster than feeling decisions, 
especially when presented with words rather than pictures and especially when the words and pictures have less bio-
logical relevance. This main proposition was supported. Implications for this proposition in terms of communication 
theory are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the years, communication researchers have spent 
a lot of time investigating the differential effects of pic-
tures and words on people’s cognition, emotion, 
memory, and comprehension. Research in this area is 
done in an attempt to ascertain whether pictures or 
words are more effective for presenting various types 
of information in different kinds of messages. This re-
search has demonstrated that the processing of words 
and pictures varies along a continuum from abstract to 
concrete. Here we are concerned only with the pro-
cessing of concrete pictures and words; that is, pictures 
and words that stand for or depict real things in the 
world. Certainly, in the era of the internet this kind of 
research is more relevant to communication research 
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than ever. In general, we find that pictures tend to be 
more arousing, more memorable, more easily pro-
cessed, and elicit more emotional response than words 
(Houts, Doak, Doak, & Loscalzo, 2006; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2006; Lang, Potter, & Bolls, 1999).  
Multiple explanations for these results exist, includ-
ing: first, that pictures are processed in parallel while 
words are processed serially, or; second, that pictures 
are processed automatically while the processing of 
words is more effortful. We, based on theories of eco-
logical perception (i.e. perception action theory), em-
bodied motivated cognition, and evolutionary psychol-
ogy, propose instead that the faster and more vigorous 
responses elicited by pictures compared to words arise 
because pictures automatically elicit more vigorous or 
thoroughly expressed evolved biologically imperative 
responses.  
Dynamic human centered communication systems 
theory (DHCCST) (Lang, 2014) is used as the framework 
for explaining and testing this theoretical hypothesis 
for why pictures, compared to words, tend to be pro-
cessed faster and elicit larger emotional responses. Un-
like most communication theories framed within the 
dominant paradigmatic approach consisting of the lin-
ear causal model, sensation-perception theory, and in-
formation processing approaches (Lang, 2013) DHCCST 
is based on a new approach based on the dynamic sys-
tems non-linear causal model, perception action theo-
ry, and motivated cognition.  
DHCCST conceptualizes communication as an 
evolved, embedded, dynamic adaptive process peculiar 
to animals acting in the world (Clark, 2008; Gibson, 
2013; Sherry, 2011). Therefore, we analyze the differ-
ences between pictures and words by considering 
them from the perspective of an evolved human acting 
in an environment over-time. Time is essential in this 
analysis and provides guidance for our theorizing at 
several scales (Berthenthal, 2007). Time is considered 
at the evolutionary scale (millions of years), at the his-
torical scale (thousands of years), the behavioral scale 
(days and hours), and at a cognitive/neurological scale 
(minutes to milliseconds). 
2. From an Evolutionary Timescale 
The primary assumption of DHCCST is that humans are 
animals and that they evolved in this particular world. 
As a result, we evolved in such a way as to be tuned to 
perceiving and acting in this world with its combination 
of forces and media. DHCCST’s ecological approach is 
based on Gibson’s ecological or direct perception theo-
ry. Sometimes called perception action theory, it is 
based on the notion that humans evolved in this par-
ticular world, which provided us with an environment 
where air, light, water, and gravity are the media that 
afford animal life and animate behavior/action. In addi-
tion to these life supporting and perception-enabling 
media through which we move, the world also contains 
substances, surfaces, detachable objects, and animals. 
Surfaces vary in opacity, hardness, texture, etc. Surfac-
es can be open (ground, walls) or closed (rooms, caves). 
Surfaces can contain substances. Objects are closed sur-
faces which can be detached and moved from one place 
to another. Animals are detachable objects with a closed 
body envelope who can change their external appear-
ance and display animate behavior. 
According to ecological perception theory, the per-
ceptual organs are evolved machines that directly pick 
up information from the world. The movement (i.e. ac-
tion) of animals and their perceptual organs through 
the world results in the direct pickup of information in 
the world allowing animals to move, find food, avoid 
danger, and procreate. The sensations of sight, hearing 
or smell are secondary to the actual pick up of the in-
formation. Action, not sensation, mediates perception. 
DHCCST defines communication as the transfer of 
information from one animal to another in an envi-
ronment over time. Communication is both evolved 
and adaptive. As evolved animals, humans have a vari-
ety of evolved communication encoding systems. 
DHCCST defines evolved communication encoding sys-
tems as those actions or emissions of animals that can 
be directly perceived by the perceptual system of an-
other animal. For example, marking behavior (i.e. leav-
ing behind a smell through an emission or the behavior 
of rubbing against something) is an evolved encoding 
system, and the mark is a form of communication that 
can be directly perceived by the olfactory system of an 
animal. Similarly, actions and expressions can be di-
rectly perceived by the visual system. Sounds (e.g. 
screams, moans, sighs, cries, growls, purrs) can be di-
rectly perceived by the auditory perceptual system. An-
imals communicate through a variety of evolved per-
ceptual systems. Bees communicate the location of 
particularly good nectar through the waggle dance 
(Riley, Greggers, Smith, Reynolds, & Menzel, 2005), ants 
secrete scent trails to guide one another towards food 
(Wilson, 1962). Humans and most mammals can smell 
your fear (de Groot, Semin, & Smeets, 2014), hear your 
cries or laughter, see your facial expressions and your 
actions, and express tenderness and love through touch. 
These are our evolved communication systems. 
The evolved human walking through the world in 
evolutionary time only encountered substances, sur-
faces, objects and animals. Their perceptual systems 
directly picked up, over time, both the invariant as-
pects of their environment (i.e. things that were not 
changing as they moved through the world) and its var-
iants (i.e. things that were changing as they moved 
through the world). Invariants include the shape of a 
mountain, the texture and orientation of the ground, 
and the location of trees. As the animal moves, some 
invariants appear while others are occluded but they 
remain invariant. Other aspects of the world are vari-
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ant. Leaves blow in the wind or fall. Animals appear, 
move, and disappear. The light changes as clouds move 
across the sun, or the sun rises and sets. Evolved com-
munication information, whether it is an emission, an 
action, an expression, a sound, or a touch is variant and 
is directly perceived. Thus, information passing be-
tween animals through evolved encoding systems is di-
rectly perceived variant information in the environ-
ment and is the basis of communication. The evolved 
human walking through the world in evolutionary time 
only encountered substances, surfaces, objects, and 
animals. They never encountered a picture or a word 
as these did not yet exist.  
3. From a Historical Timescale 
And then someone made a drawing--in the sand, in the 
mud, on a cave wall, with chalk, with paint…and there 
was a picture. What is a picture? According to Gibson 
(2013) a picture is a surface that captures the invariant 
aspects of a place or an object at a time and freezes it. 
Ecological perception mediated by action includes both 
variant and invariant information. A picture is not an 
evolved encoding system. It is a man-made invention 
that captures the invariant aspects of a thing at a spe-
cific moment in time. In particular, it captures shape, 
color and form. What it doesn’t capture are the vari-
ants of the object or the place. Thus, a picture of a cat 
has the form and the color and the shape of a cat but it 
doesn’t have locomotion, sniffing, licking, being ruffled 
by the wind, or being soft when you touch it. When we 
see a picture of a cat, we directly perceive the invari-
ants of the cat. But the picture of a cat affords only 
what is afforded by the visual invariant aspects of a cat 
provided in the ambient light array (i.e. information 
available to the visual perceptual system). As a result, 
the picture affords only looking at a cat, not stroking it, 
smelling it, or hearing it purr. But the form, shape, and 
color of the cat are still available for direct perception. 
DHCCST defines pictures as a manmade representa-
tional encoding system. Manmade representational 
systems are those that contain information that is di-
rectly perceivable by some perceptual system, but do 
not contain all of the perceptual information that 
would be available in the real object, substance, sur-
face, or animal. 
And then there were words. After pictures came 
words. Words are, in a sense, pictures. They are surfaces 
that provide invariant edges arranged in various orienta-
tions fixed in time. Their shape, color, and form can be 
directly perceived but these shapes and forms are not 
related to the shapes and forms of the things that they 
stand for. The shape of the word cat does not provide 
any directly perceived information about the invariants 
of the cat. The only directly perceivable information in a 
word is the shape, color, and form of the word. Thus, the 
meaning of the word is not directly perceivable. 
4. From the Neurological and Cognitive Timescales 
What happens, then, when we see a word? How do we 
get from directly perceiving the form of the word cat, 
to knowing that the word “cat” stands for cat. As com-
plex evolved animals, humans consist of multiple nest-
ed complex systems. DHCCST pays particular attention 
to the cognitive/neurological system embedded in a 
physiological system, embedded in a motivational sys-
tem, embedded in a perceptual system, embedded in a 
biological system. Each of these systems evolved to 
function in this world and constrains, interacts with, fa-
cilitates, and inhibits actions and reactions in the other 
systems over time. These systems are nested in the 
human both biologically and within time. The neurolog-
ical system is in a faster band than the cognitive 
(Berthenthal, 2007). Complex interactions of these sys-
tems allow us to act, perceive, feel, and think in the 
world. DHCCST builds on Hofstadter’s (Hofstadter, 
2000) conceptualization of an active symbol to bridge 
the gap between direct perception of the form of the 
word “cat” and the sensation of the meaning of the 
word “cat”. According to Hofstadter, an active symbol 
is something in the world which initially elicits neuronal 
activation associated with its form, but then immedi-
ately activates additional neuronal activity associated 
with its meaning and our knowledge of the thing that 
the symbol stands for. This activity eventually leads to 
the cognitive sensation of meaning. Thus, when looking 
at pictures we directly perceive the form of the thing 
that is represented and respond to it without sensa-
tion. When looking at words we directly perceive the 
form of the word but not the form of the thing that is 
symbolized. The form triggers neurological activity that 
both leads to an understanding of the meaning of the 
word and triggers the appropriate biological response. 
Thus, the perception of the form of a word is mediated 
by action, but the perception of the meaning of a word 
is mediated by sensation. The perception action neuro-
logical loop has been shown to be much shorter and 
therefore much faster than the perception action loop 
(Pearson, 1985). Thus, while the form of the word is di-
rectly perceived as quickly as the form of the picture, the 
form of the word carries no evolved invariants that will 
trigger a biologically imperative response while the form 
of the directly perceived concrete picture does. The 
meaning of a word arrives more slowly with completion 
of the perception sensation loop and triggers a biologi-
cally imperative response, should one be appropriate. 
DHCCST argues that this difference between a rep-
resentation (e.g. picture) of something and a symbol 
(e.g. word) of something is at the heart of the differen-
tial responses we see in people to concrete words and 
pictures. People directly perceive the meaning of a rep-
resentational picture which leads directly to the 
evolved biologically imperative response. People do 
not directly perceive the meaning of a word and there-
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fore their initial response to a word is neurological and 
then cognitive. The faster neurological component of 
the directly perceived picture automatically triggers 
the evolved biological response before the sensation of 
meaning but more slowly than the directly elicited re-
sponse to the picture.  
Having made this claim it makes sense to temper it 
slightly. Because communication is adaptive, it makes 
sense that a shouted word (Fire!) should elicit almost 
the same evolved response as the presence of fire. If 
words completely removed the ability to act swiftly, 
without the sensation of meaning and conscious 
thought, to protect ourselves from threat or seize op-
portunity, they would not be a particularly adaptive 
form of communication. Yet we know from many areas 
of priming research that, for practiced readers, peo-
ple’s physical and biological responses to words do 
begin before they are consciously perceived and identi-
fied. Similarly, priming research has also shown larger 
responses for pictures than for words (Carr, McCauley, 
Sperber, & Parmelee, 1982). However, once cognition 
catches up, we also have the ability to either facilitate 
or inhibit that evolved response. In this nested system 
approach it is likely that the repeated pairing of the 
meaning of the word with the invariant shape of the 
word results in the shape of the word developing moti-
vational relevance, but this response is smaller than that 
elicit by the evolved invariants of the shape of a cat.  
5. From a Behavioral Timescale 
DHCCST sees human behavior as the dynamic self-
organization of the human nested systems. At this 
timescale as the human animal acts in the evolved 
world it directly picks up information about the sur-
rounding environment and its contents, perceiving 
what the environment affords to promote survival and 
task completion. 
This direct perception of the information in the 
world is nested in our biological motivational systems 
which evolved to promote survival. Hence, danger, 
threats, food, and mates are directly perceived which 
leads to biological and motivational reflexes that sup-
port protective or approach behavior. Action towards 
and away from motivationally relevant things in the 
environment, that is things which afford threat or op-
portunity, begins with direct perception of those things 
and the elicitation of biological motivational responses. 
DHCCST conceptualizes motivational responses using 
Caccioppo’s dual motivational system model (Cacioppo 
& Berntson, 1994, 1999; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; 
Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997).This model pos-
its two independent motivational systems, the ap-
proach or appetitive system and the aversive or defen-
sive system. The two systems have been shown to have 
different patterns of activation. Of importance here is 
that the aversive system has been show to activate 
more quickly and more vigorously than the appetitive 
system. This characteristic of the aversive motivational 
activation function is called the negativity bias. Initial 
activation in the direct perceptual, biological (e.g. mo-
tor), and motivational systems has been shown to be 
faster than neurological and cognitive responses to the 
environment and its contents. For example, Whelan, 
Hiebert and Pearson (1995) showed that changes in 
gait (biological) in response to direct perception of var-
iations in the ground occurred before the information 
could have travelled from the foot to the brain and 
back again, given the speed of nerve propagation, as 
would have to happen if the gait change resulted from 
sensation based perception. Similarly, motivation 
based alteration in probe stimuli can be seen as early 
as 8 msec post probe onset. The motivational response 
can modulate the auditory nerve response at 8 msec 
post probe onset suggesting that the motivational sys-
tem is faster than one of the fastest parts of the neuro-
logical system (Davis, 1997). Cognitive facilitation or 
inhibition of these automatic/reflexive actions comes 
somewhat later. This means that motivationally rele-
vant information in the environment directly elicits bio-
logically imperative responses. Its mere presence be-
gins a response that may or may not be stoppable. If 
the response is very swift (e.g. a startle response (pro-
tective) or an orienting response (approach) they can’t 
be stopped. If it’s a slower acting response (e.g. moving 
forward or back, hiding, etc.) its continuation may be 
slowed by cognitive inhibition or sped up by cognitive 
facilitation. 
6. Media as Part of the World 
DHCCST argues that when an animal encounters moti-
vationally relevant contents in the world they respond 
in an evolved biologically imperative manner. But what 
happens when motivationally relevant representations 
(e.g. pictures) and symbols (e.g. words) are encoun-
tered in the environment? Decades of communication 
research have supported the conclusion that responses 
to mediated information are very similar, at least at the 
neurological time scale, to responses to similar infor-
mation in the world (Reeves & Nass, 1996). It has been 
found, in previous studies examining the processing of 
words and pictures, that pleasant and unpleasant 
words and pictures automatically activate the motiva-
tional systems (Lang, 2009; Lang & Yegiyan, 2009; Lee 
& Lang, 2009) with pleasant words and pictures elicit-
ing appetitive activation and unpleasant words and pic-
tures eliciting aversive activation (P. J. Lang, Green-
wald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Thus, both pictures and 
words elicit motivational activation but, due to the 
negativity bias, unpleasant pictures and words elicit 
more activation than pleasant pictures and words.  
However, as discussed previously, we are arguing 
that when perceiving pictures, the biologically evolved 
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response, either aversive or appetitive, will begin im-
mediately because the form of the motivationally rele-
vant thing can be directly picked up from a picture. 
However, as time continues and there are no variants 
to accompany the invariants in the picture, the re-
sponse may unfold in a less vigorous manner since 
there are no indications that the picture contains fur-
ther motivationally relevant information (e.g. animate 
behavior). On the other hand, when a motivationally 
relevant word is encountered, there is no direct pickup 
of the form of the object, only the form of the word. 
Instead, the neurological response occurs identifying 
the shape of the word, which then triggers the biologi-
cal response of identifying threat or opportunity and 
eventually the cognitive identification of the thing. For 
this reason, DHCCST argues that symbols (i.e. words) 
result in a slower, less vigorous, and more modifiable 
biologically imperative response and then enable its 
inhibition or facilitation. 
These biologically imperative motivational respons-
es happen automatically and quickly in order to sup-
port behavior towards opportunity and away from 
threat. Therefore, they can interfere with other ongo-
ing behaviors. Research demonstrates that automati-
cally elicited motivational responses interfere with and 
slow learned and ongoing behaviors (Boysen, Berntson, 
Hannan, & Cacioppo, 1996) and that the larger the bio-
logical imperative, the greater the interference with 
the task.  
7. Processing Pictures and Words 
What does this mean for the processing of pictures and 
words? The theory described above offers four basic 
propositions from which to predict human processing 
of words and pictures. First, pictures elicit bigger and 
faster biologically imperative responses than do words. 
Second, unpleasant things elicit larger biologically im-
perative responses than do pleasant things. Third, bio-
logically imperative responses happen automatically, 
take time to occur, and affect not only the timing but 
also the trajectories of other behavior. They may speed 
certain types of related behavior (e.g. approaching, 
avoiding), but may interfere with and slow other be-
havior (e.g. accessing stored information, making deci-
sions). Fourth, biologically imperative responses can be 
actively inhibited over time and that inhibition will be 
more successful during the delayed responses trig-
gered by neuronal activation than during the direct ac-
tivation of the response by pictures.  
To test these propositions we have designed an ex-
periment in which people view, on a computer screen, 
60 pairs of matched motivationally relevant concrete 
pictures and words (e.g. the word apple, a picture of an 
apple). Half of the picture/word pairs are motivational-
ly relevant and pleasant (e.g. food, sex, babies) and half 
are motivationally relevant and unpleasant (e.g. blood, 
death, weapons, snakes). Participants view and catego-
rize the 120 pictures two times. Once, participants cat-
egorize as fast as they can, whether the thing on screen 
is a picture (representation) or a word (symbol) (called 
form categorization). The other time, they categorize 
whether the thing on screen is pleasant or unpleasant 
(called emotional categorization).  
Applying the propositions, we expect slower cate-
gorization when biological imperatives are larger. 
Therefore, in general, (H1) pictures and (H2) negative 
things should have larger biologically imperative re-
sponses and be categorized more slowly than words 
and positive things.  
The next prediction (H3) is that emotional categori-
zation will be slower than form (word/picture) catego-
rization. This is because neither the meaning nor the 
emotional valence of the word or picture is necessary 
to categorize whether it is a picture or a word. There-
fore, the human system will self-organize, during this 
task, in such a way as to perform the task most suc-
cessfully and efficiently. This means that people will 
automatically (and perhaps even intentionally) inhibit 
their motivational systems in order to decrease the in-
terference of the biologically imperative response with 
the encoding system categorization task. This should 
reduce the size of the response and increase the speed 
of categorization. However, during the emotional cate-
gorization task, it is the activation of the motivational 
systems in response to the directly perceived stimulus 
that leads to the sensation of pleasantness or unpleas-
antness. In order to do this task efficiently participants’ 
need the information provided by the biologically im-
perative response. Therefore, they will not inhibit the 
motivational systems (to the same degree), resulting in 
larger responses and slower categorization. 
In addition, it is possible that there may be some in-
teractions. For example, the difference in categoriza-
tion speed between unpleasant pictures and unpleas-
ant words will likely be larger than the difference 
between positive pictures and positive words. Re-
search question 1 asks if there are any interactions.  
8. Method 
8.1. Experimental Design 
A 2 (Task: Emotional categorization, Form categoriza-
tion) × 2 (Encoding System: representation/picture, 
symbol/word) × 2 (Valence: Pleasant, Unpleasant) × 15 
(pictures) fully within-subjects factorial design was used.  
8.2. Independent Variables 
Stimulus. The stimulus consisted of 60 words and 60 
pictures which were representations of the words. The 
60 words were concrete words selected from the Af-
fective Norms for English Words (ANEW) system (Brad-
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ley & Lang, 1999). The ANEW system contains over 
1000 words that are normed for valence and arousal. 
Thirty of the 60 words chosen were rated as pleasant 
and 30 were rated as unpleasant. The 60 pictures were 
selected from Google Images to represent the words. 
The images were selected controlling for background 
and size. The focal object (which represented the 
word) was large and centrally foregrounded and back-
grounds were simple and emotionally neutral. 
Categorization Task. Participants completed two 
timed categorizations of the stimulus set. The form 
categorization task required participants to view the 
words and pictures in random order and indicate 
whether each was a word or a picture by pressing one 
of two indicated keys on the keyboard as quickly as 
possible. The emotional categorization task used the 
same procedure but participants were asked to catego-
rize whether the word or picture was emotionally 
pleasant or unpleasant. Participants were instructed to 
use fingers on different hands. They used either the R-
Shift (positive) versus L-Shift (negative) for the emotion 
categorization or R-Ctrl (picture) vs. L-Ctrl buttons 
(word), which are on opposite sides of the keyboard to 
complete the categorizations. The more natural posi-
tion for using these keys was two hands, and this was 
the demonstrated positioning. The keys representing a 
category were the same for all participants. This should 
not be a problem as Woods, Wyma, Yund, Herron & 
Reed (2015) demonstrated that simple categorizations 
were not affected by handedness except in cases of 
lateral presentation. In this study there was no laterali-
zation of stimuli. Pictures and words were always pre-
sented in the center of the screen.  
8.3. Dependent Variables 
Response Latency. Items were evaluated one at a time. 
Individuals were instructed to keep their fingers on the 
response keys and answer as quickly as possible with-
out sacrificing accuracy. The time of evaluation for 
each image or word was collected in milliseconds from 
the time the item appeared to the time the participant 
pressed a response key. The accuracy of the categori-
zation of each word and picture in both tasks 
(word/picture or pleasant/unpleasant) was monitored. 
Proportion correct was computed. Accuracy was slight-
ly higher for the form task (97%) than the emotional 
valence task (89%).  
8.4. Data Analysis 
Measures were taken to deal with outliers in these la-
tency data. For each categorization, reaction time out-
liers over and under 2.49 standard deviations from the 
mean were replaced with the value of that limit 
(Cousineau, & Chartier, 2010). In order to do this, Z-
scores were calculated. Of the total 11,520 reaction 
time responses in both tasks, only 383 (3%) were re-
placed (187 in the emotional task and 196 in the form 
task). After replacing the outliers, the Z-scores were 
then calculated back into milliseconds for analysis. These 
data were then analyzed as raw data submitted to a 2 
(Categorization Task: Emotional, Form) × 2 (Encoding 
System: Word, Picture) × 2 (Valence: Pleasant, Unpleas-
ant) × 15 (Repetitions) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
8.5. Participants 
Participants (N = 48) were undergraduates in a tele-
communications class and received extra credit in the 
course for their participation. 60% were females with a 
median age of 18.  
8.6. Procedure 
Participants completed the protocol individually. Upon 
arrival informed consent was obtained after all partici-
pants’ questions were answered satisfactorily. Then, 
participants were seated at a laptop station equipped 
with MediaLab and DirectRT software (Jarvis, 2010), 
which were responsible for delivering the stimuli and 
collecting responses. Participants first engaged in an un-
related picture evaluation task. Next, participants com-
pleted the emotional and form categorization tasks in 
random order. Upon completion of these tasks, the par-
ticipants completed a series of personality scales. Then, 
participants were thanked, debriefed and dismissed. 
9. Results 
Hypothesis one predicted that people would categorize 
pictures as pictures more slowly than they would cate-
gorize words as words. The main effect of encoding sys-
tem was significant, F(1,47)=17.64., p<.00, η2= .27. The 
average categorization speed for pictures was slower 
(M=706.10, SE=14.243) than that found for words 
(M=668.40, SE=11.40) across both categorization tasks.  
Hypothesis two predicted that classifying feelings 
would be slower than classifying form. The main effect 
of task was significant, (F(1,48)=279.82, p<.00, η2= .86. 
On average people categorized how they felt much 
more slowly (M=869.40, SE=20.47) than form 
(M=505.10, SE=10.57).  
Hypothesis three predicted that unpleasant pic-
tures and words would be categorized more slowly 
than pleasant pictures and words. The main effect of 
valence only approached significance, F(1,48)=2.62, 
p<.11, η2= .05, though it was in the correct direction. 
On average people categorized negative words and pic-
tures more slowly (M=695.99, SE=15.29) than positive 
pictures and words (M=678.51, SE=10.82).  
Research question one asked about the possibility 
of interactions. There were no significant interactions, 
though the task X valence interaction approached sig-
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nificance, F(1,47) = 1.84, p <.18, η2= .04. During form 
categorization (when the motivational systems are in-
hibited) there is virtually no difference in the speed of 
categorizing words (M=503.31, SE=10.00) and pictures 
(M=506.90, SE=11.46). During valence categorization, 
however, pictures are categorized more slowly 
(M=885.09, SE=26.89) than words (M=853.71, 
SE=18.07), t(47)=2.97, p<.01. 
10. Discussion 
This paper uses DHCCST to reconceptualize communi-
cation from an evolved, embedded, embodied, dynam-
ic perspective. The difference between pictures and 
words is considered to be a difference in perception. 
Pictures are thought to enable direct perception (or 
perception mediated by action) while words are 
thought to allow direct perception only of the shape of 
the word. Subsequent neurological and cognitive activ-
ity is required before the meaning of a word is under-
stood (sensation mediated perception). For this reason 
it is argued that pictures elicit faster and more intense 
biologically imperative responses (associated with ap-
proach and avoidance), which interfere with ongoing 
tasks. Thus, pictures, through direct perception, elicit ac-
tion, especially that action which is in service of biologi-
cally imperative behaviors (consuming food, finding ma-
tes, avoiding danger). Words on the other hand, elicit a 
delayed biological response which can then be inhibited 
or facilitated once it is activated. For this reason, words 
allow us to think about motivationally relevant material 
in a more cognitive and less motivational fashion. 
Using this perspective it was predicted that 1) peo-
ple would categorize pictures as pictures more slowly 
than they would categorize words as words; 2) that 
they would perform form categorization faster than 
emotional categorization, and; 3) that they would cat-
egorize negative words and pictures more slowly than 
positive words and pictures. Hypothesis 1 and 2 were 
supported. Hypothesis 3 was partially supported by the 
nearly significant task X valence interaction which 
showed no difference between pleasant and unpleas-
ant pictures and words during form categorization but 
a significantly slower categorization of unpleasant 
compared to pleasant pictures and words during emo-
tional categorization.  
The primary importance of these findings may be 
that they provide initial support for the approach being 
advocated by DHCCST but there are also some implica-
tions for communication research. A great deal of 
communication research has focused on the use of pic-
tures compared to text or television compared to print. 
In general pictures are found to be remembered 
somewhat better than text (Finnegan & Vishwanath, 
1996), to elicit somewhat more attention (Houts et al., 
2006), and to improve memory for text, especially 
when the topic of the picture or the news is concrete 
(David, 1998). In addition, it has been suggested that 
picture processing requires fewer cognitive resources 
compared to the processing of words (Lang et al., 
1999). And while the evidence is somewhat mixed it 
has been suggested that pictures increase comprehen-
sion, attention, and memory even more for people 
with lower levels of literacy (Finnegan & Vishwanath, 
1996; Houts et al., 2006).  
The results of this study support the contention 
that concrete pictures, because they are directly per-
ceived, activate very fast acting biological and motiva-
tional systems, which then slave the initial response of 
slower acting, higher order systems. This direct percep-
tion is not related to literacy or education or previous 
knowledge, but only to our nature as evolved humans. 
As a result, pictures, and in particular those that are 
threats or opportunities (i.e. motivationally relevant), 
will be perceived, attended to, and understood by 
these lower acting processes faster and at a lower level 
than the same information presented in words. This 
could be the underlying mechanism for the higher or-
der cognitive effects described above. 
It is also worth pointing out that the results of this 
study do not correspond to the predictions of more 
cognitive, information processing based approaches to 
the processing of words and pictures and standard in-
terpretations of simple reaction time as it relates to 
processing, resource allocation, and attention. For ex-
ample, the LC4MP argues that motivationally relevant 
compared to non-motivationally relevant media con-
tent both elicits a greater allocation of cognitive re-
sources and requires their use. As a result, as motiva-
tional relevance increases motivationally relevant 
material is thought to be harder to process and to lead 
more quickly to cognitive overload. This prediction has 
been supported using secondary task reaction times 
and recognition as a combined indicator of available 
resource (i.e. resources allocated–resources required) 
both for audio (verbal/word) and visual (picture) infor-
mation. To the extent that pictures and words are pro-
cessed differently, the LC4MP argues that pictures may 
improve memory because they require fewer resources 
to process than words and therefore encounter cogni-
tive overload less quickly compared to verbal and text 
stimuli. But these arguments of automatic processing 
and fewer resources for pictures do not translate into a 
prediction that pictures will categorized as pictures more 
slowly than words would be categorized as words. Ra-
ther the more likely prediction would be that motiva-
tionally relevant information (whether a picture or a 
word) should be categorized more quickly than non-
motivationally relevant information and that effect 
would be larger for negative motivationally relevant in-
formation due to the negativity bias. But the results of 
this study are the opposite of that prediction. Instead 
negative motivationally relevant images are categorized 
as images more slowly than any of the other categories.  
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The results of this study are in line with communi-
cation research that theorizes that negative infor-
mation (and in these studies primarily pictorial or au-
dio/visual negative information) is compelling (Grabe & 
Kamhawi, 2006; Newhagen & Reeves, 1992; Shoemak-
er, 1996). This research is based on the idea that we 
evolved to keep track of threats in the environment 
and therefore that we automatically attend to negative 
information. Again, the suggestion here is that motiva-
tionally relevant pictures are indeed directly perceived 
and that the elicited biological imperative (which 
evolved to protect the animal) precedes and interferes 
with other tasks and processes. In other words, moti-
vationally relevant pictures, in particular those of pri-
mary motivators such as sex, food, and danger, should 
interfere more with other tasks, thereby compelling 
the processing of the motivationally relevant material. 
Finally, these results provide encouraging support 
for the DHCCST perspective. Future research in this ar-
ea should be done to attempt to track the underlying 
processes theorized to result in the behavioral results 
found in this paper. For example, one idea would be to 
include neutral pictures and words as a comparison. 
DHCCST would predict that neutral words and pictures 
depicting objects would not differ in the time it takes to 
categorize form and valence (as pleasant, unpleasant, or 
neutral) because they would not elicit biologically im-
perative responses to delay and interfere with the task.  
Building on direct perception research, future re-
search could compare word/picture pairs of objects 
with those of pleasant and unpleasant animals. Given 
that animals are more consequential than objects 
(because they can engage in animate behavior) one 
might expect them to elicit larger biological responses 
than objects Building on theories of motivational rel-
evance, future studies might also compare 
word/picture pairs that differ in their levels of moti-
vational relevance. Some pairs might represent pri-
mary reinforcers (food, sex, blood, attacking animals) 
and others things that are merely pleasant and un-
pleasant (flowers, garbage, etc.) Here the prediction 
would be that the primary reinforcer word/picture 
pairs would have a larger biological imperative than 
the merely pleasant and unpleasant word/picture 
pairs. Building on the suggestion made earlier, that 
the shape of a word may become motivationally rele-
vant over repeated pairings, might be tested by exam-
ining categorization speed differences in pairs of high-
ly arousing and calm words of different frequency of 
occurrence in the English language. Finally, future re-
search might use neurological and physiological indica-
tors of motivational activation to ascertain if indeed 
emotional pictures lead to faster neurological and mo-
tivational responses compared to words and if motiva-
tional activation is lower during form compared to pic-
ture categorization. This would provide additional 
support for the notion that timed response data can be 
used as an indicator of the level of inhibition of the mo-
tivational systems. 
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